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BACKGROUND:

Opened 17 March 2023

The last federal shutdown occurred in December 2018 to January 2019, and current appropriations would expire on 30 September 2023. For the purposes of this question, a "shutdown of the US federal government" would mean a ceasing of operations due to a lack of funding appropriation. A partial shutdown would count.

Examples of Superforecaster commentary in italics

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AT A GLANCE:

11 September 2023 - Good Judgment's professional Superforecasters see a 72% probability that there will be a shutdown of the US federal government before 1 November 2024. The Superforecasters point out this has occurred four out of five times since 1990 when the president and the House represented opposite parties.


SUPERFORECASTER COMMENTARY HIGHLIGHTS:

10 Sep 23 - Comment: This WaPo article suggests, optimistically, that Senators are "united" in passing bipartisan budget bills, avoiding a shutdown.

02 Sep 23 - Comment: I'm moving all the way to the base rate of 80% for the case of President and House of opposite parties. A shortish shutdown seems like the easiest way for McCarthy to retain his job. History shows that shutdowns have been as common in election years as non-election years, so this will still be in limbo even without a 2023 shutdown. Freedom caucus members are generally in safe districts, so election year pressures may have less impact on them.

21 Aug 23 - Comment: Negotiations have started. From the Hill: "The hardline conservative House Freedom Caucus said it plans to oppose any stopgap government funding bill that doesn't include policy measures relating to the border, the Department of Justice and 'woke' policies at the Pentagon, according to a draft press release obtained by The Hill. The official position against a 'clean' continuing resolution comes after Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) told House GOP members last week that he expects to move a short-term measure to fund the government past the end of the fiscal year on Sept. 30 and avert a government shutdown."

12 Aug 23 - Comment: Rep. Jeff Jackson (D-NC) forecasts a shutdown.

07 Aug 23 - Comment: The Fitch rating change may embolden certain groups in the next fiscal fight.

05 Aug 23 - Comment: Government shutdowns are pretty common in election years, even presidential election years. A shutdown (or another shutdown) shortly before the 2024 elections could be perceived as politically advantageous by either or both sides. I'm moving closer to our general base rate of 80% chance of shutdown over two years. There are a total of 21 shutdowns from 1976 and later. By my count, slightly over half (11) occur in election years. Of those, 3 were in presidential election years, but all of those 3 were prior to election day, which would meet our 1 November criteria.

03 Aug 23 - Comment: Fitch downgraded the US long-term credit rating in part due to the political polarization and the steady deterioration of governance.

24 Jul 23 - Comment: This Washington Post opinion piece explains the budget disagreement between the political parties, as well as the how and the why a shutdown could occur in October 2023. Even if a shutdown does not happen by this fall, there will remain a full year for a blowup before this question closes.

21 Jul 23 - Comment: From the Hill: "Sen. Chris Coons (D-Del.) warned on Friday that a government shutdown appears likely, as Congress faces down a September deadline to pass its annual spending bills."

21 Jul 23 - Comment: Two bites at the apple: budget for fiscal 2024 by October this year and fiscal 2025 by October 2025. Given the Freedom Caucus penchant for no compromise, I will stay with a higher chance of a shutdown. Even the bi-partisan Defense Appropriation will be difficult to move along this time because of all the added amendments in the House version.

10 Jul 23 - Comment: Most of the government shutdown risk is associated with funding for fiscal year 2024 due to our question closing date of "before November 1, 2024." Only in 1991 did a shutdown occur quickly enough to meet the November 1 threshold. However, prior to that there were several September and October shutdowns. My general two-year base rate is 80%, but to account for question timing, I will reduce to 60%. Forecast: The base Republican plan to pass funding bills below the levels of the ceiling agreement makes a shutdown more likely than not this year (55%). There is an incremental chance of shutdown associated with 2025 funding before November 1, 2024.

05 Jul 23 - Comment: House GOP may move stopgap spending bill as soon as this month. This option would take October shutdown off the table as fight for cuts goes on.

23 Jun 23 - Comment: There is a split within the Republican Party in the House making a deal difficult there. The Senate will not agree to the cuts Republicans will want to make. Rep. Hakeem Jeffries (D-N.Y.), the House minority leader, has said Democrats will oppose anything less than the agreed-upon debt ceiling levels.

18 Jun 23 - Comment: Partisan politics, particularly going into an election year, have a high probability of creating a situation causing, at minimum, a partial shutdown. That said, I've decided to forecast a lower probability of a shutdown as a result of some political-economic factors:
- Regional banking risks related to commercial real estate have yet to be fully exposed. As the probability of a recession and/or banking issue rises, the probability of a shutdown decreases. Further, if a capital markets/economic event like this were to occur during a continuing stagflationary economic environment, we can expect some sort of monetary and/or fiscal package or accommodation, and any shutdown (less government spending) would further exacerbate the situation in the immediate/short term.
- Also, it seems that the political tensions are at the forefront of why a shutdown would happen. However, it also seemed as the though the debt debate was just Kabuki Theater. If so, both sides will simply want to take a victory lap as neither side wants the possibility of having the albatross of a shutdown around their neck going into an election year.
If the bureaucratic and political rhetoric/maneuvering transitions into some tangible actions that make the logistics of making a deal on time more difficult, I'll revise up.

17 Jun 23 - Comment: Higher probability than I initially gave after the debt ceiling was done through compromise. The Republicans who were critical of that deal (and of their leader for making the deal) are threatening a shutdown to achieve greater cuts. The process itself enables more roadblocks to funding.

15 Jun 23 - Comment: From NY Mag: "Did We Just Trade a Debt Default for a Government Shutdown? ...This means it will be impossible under the debt-limit deal to paper over partisan and House-Senate differences on spending levels for individual federal programs by just tossing them into a stopgap spending bill that ultimately gets extended until the end of the fiscal year, after which the whole process begins again. So the odds of at least partial government shutdowns beginning in October and extending to the end of December are very high."
From MSNBC: "While the intraparty fighting might seem like a good time for schadenfreude for Democrats, it's set to have serious consequences. McCarthy and Granger's caving in to demands for spending cuts beyond the debt ceiling deal makes the threat of a government shutdown this fall all the more real."

14 Jun 23 - Comment: Raising probability to 80%. Sources: (1) "McCarthy's Deal Risks Shutdown"; (2) "The Odds of a Government Shutdown Just Shot Up".

11 Jun 23 - Comment: A list of previous shutdowns since 1980, including the party of the president, Senate, and House at the time each one occurred. Note that only one president (George W Bush) during this time period avoided a shutdown while in office. Base rate for a shutdown during a president's tenure is 83.3% (5 of 6) in the last 45-ish years. I realize there are other ways of looking at it, and Biden seems more apt to negotiate a deal than many of his predecessors, so I'm currently forecasting closer to 30 than 83, but there is definitely precedent and opportunity for this question to resolve as 'yes.'
Dec 2018-Jan 2019 Trump (R), Senate (R), House (D)
Jan 2018 Trump (R), Senate (R), House (D)
Oct 2013 Obama (D), Senate (D), House (R)
Nov/Dec 1995 Clinton (D), Senate (R), House (R)
Oct 1990 Bush Sr. (R), Senate (D), House (D)
Nov 1981, Oct 1984, Oct 1986 Reagan (R), Senate (R), House (D)
May 1980 Carter (D), Senate (D), House (D)

04 Jun 23 - Comment: From the Hill: "Rep. Garret Graves (R-La.), a key negotiator in recent debt ceiling talks, acknowledged that some House Republicans may be emboldened from the recent debt negotiations and said he wouldn't rule out the possibility of a government shutdown when Congress debates the appropriations bills in the fall."

03 Jun 23 - Comment: As I understand it, there are 3 main ways this could go:
1. They pass all the appropriations bills. No shutdown.
2. They don't pass the appropriations bills, but pass a continuing resolution, which--per order of the debt deal--must include cuts to domestic programs and defense. No shutdown.
3. They don't pass either the appropriations bills or a budget-cutting continuing resolution. Shutdown--until they agree on either option 1 or 2.
The key thing to understand, in my opinion, is that the debt deal 1% cuts aren't what's known as an automatic continuing resolution. They don't just happen by default, Congress needs to vote for them. The real change is that, instead of having the option to punt by voting for a continuing resolution that maintains spending at current levels, Congress--in the absence of an actual budget agreement--will be obligated to vote for a continuing resolution with cuts.
Aside from the fact that this has buy-in from some heavy hitters on the Democrat and Republican side in Congress who claim that it might help avert a shutdown, and a general sense that the dept relief compromise was an indication that compromise is possible (assuming McCarthy is still the speaker), I'm not sure it really lowered the odds of a shutdown. Especially since, given that the debt limit was suspended for ~2 yrs instead of just being raised, now everyone can argue over emergency supplementals (defense included) that, as I understand it, are outside the normal budgeting process, but would be part of any budget debate.

31 May 23 - Comment: If I'm reading this right, the agreement forces additional cuts if Congress does not pass appropriations bills. That sounds similar to the circa 2011 sequester, which also had penalties for not passing appropriations. Except the penalties failed to motivate Congress.

28 May 23 - Comment: The debt-ceiling agreement reached between McCarthy and Biden "also includes an enforcement measure that is meant to avert a government shutdown later this year" during budget negotiations. So, I think the chance there will be a government shutdown in 2023 is now less than I did before. But it still remains to be seen whether this provision will actually stay in any final debt-ceiling bill to be passed by Congress over the coming week or so. If the debt ceiling is raised but this provision to avert a shutdown is struck from the final law, then I think the chance is high that we will see a shutdown later this year. But for now, I'll stay at 50/50, until I see what's in any final debt-ceiling law that gets passed by Congress.

26 May 23 - Comment: Lowering on rumors that an eventual debt ceiling deal may also include provisions to "prevent a fall government shutdown."

24 May 23 - Comment: Long time frame, minimum two chances, high base rate, increasing polarization in DC. I feel the number is 40-45% in 2023 alone and probably higher in 2024 if it won't happen in 2023.

16 May 23 - Comment: Rethinking this a bit, based on apparent progress on debt ceiling talks, which indicates to me that both President Biden and many in the GOP do not see much advantage in brinksmanship leading up to 2024 election.

13 May 23 - Comment: If not over the debt, then over the next budget. The US is divided and voting margins are too close. We are talking two budget cycles here. If we get through this potential default period without a default, I will lower this.

07 May 23 - Comment: 81% is approximately the base rate for shutdowns during periods of divided government in the last 45 years. I don't see any reason for optimism regarding the ability to make it another year and a half without at least a partial shutdown, but I'm also hesitant to raise my forecast much above base rate.

07 May 23 - Comment: Voting margins in Congress are narrow. On the other hand, going into an election year neither side wants the blame for negative consequences, so perhaps there will be a deal.

16 Apr 23 - Comment: Given the divides not only between political parties but also within them, I give the chance of getting the budget done in time as low. Republicans will try to use it to make Biden look bad, and Democrats to use it to show Republicans as chaotic obstructionists to good order.

15 Apr 23 - Comment: The base rate is around 80% given every president has presided over a shutdown except GWB since Carter, and we're currently in a period of divided government. Perhaps I'm wrong, but I give Biden slightly better odds given his deal-making attitude toward Congress.

09 Apr 23 - Comment: A shutdown happens when the parties in Congress, or Congress and the President, cannot agree on priorities and spending levels. No budget is passed, so the government has to shutdown. Given the political divisions in Congress and the country, this seems more than 50% likely. Last one was December 22, 2018, and carried on for 35 days. On the other hand, there is an election in 2024 and each side would spin to blame the other. This might lead to whoever is losing the public relations game to give in.

24 Mar 23 - Comment: Base rates: (1) Since 1990, every time there were a president and the House of the opposite party, there has been a shutdown early in the shared-power term, except for the end of the second half of George W. Bush's second term (4 out of 5 = 80%). (2) In 2011, there was a major budget deal under threat of shutdown. An actual shutdown occurred in October 2013. So the base rate for shutdown in the opening year of shared power is 3 out of 5 (60%).
Evidence for shutdown: (1) Base rates favor conflict and shutdown. (2) New House leadership with new rules increase the likelihood of shutdown. Evidence against: Some potential for a negotiated solution as in 2011.

21 Mar 23 - Comment: There is plenty of precedents. However, Biden has shown an ability to get stuff done and past shutdowns have not gone well for GOP, so there may be some room to maneuver here. Some of this depend on who the frontrunner for GOP nomination in and their statements on the issue.

19 Mar 23 - Comment: There are two ways this could happen: (1) The normal way, where the Federal government doesn't pass a budget or continuing resolution by Oct 1, or where continuing resolutions lapse after. This can happen in 2023 or 2024. (2) The debt ceiling is breached. There does not seem to be a way to put off default by shutting down the government for a period; however, it could be involved in a semi-default period (e.g., where social security payments are delayed). These semi-default scenarios are unclear. Depending on the deal reached this summer, default could become possible twice in the question time frame.
A few scenarios: (1) There could be a shutdown in 2023 and/or early 2024 as each side stakes out policy positions prior to an election year and Republicans attempt to make up ground after raising the debt ceiling. (2) Biden could agree to spending cuts as part of the debt ceiling debate in exchange for a smoother budget process this fall, adding to the public perception of stability and sound governance ahead of the 2024 campaign season. (3) A recession could lead to bipartisan support for some deficit spending and stable governance, superseding the debt ceiling and budget issues. A partial shutdown for a short period could occur in any scenario.

18 Mar 23 - Comment: The fight over the debt ceiling will be an indicator of things to come.

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BACKGROUND:

Opened 28 April 2023

The next presidential election in Russia under current law is scheduled for 17 March 2024.

Examples of Superforecaster commentary in italics

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AT A GLANCE:

11 September 2023 - Good Judgment's professional Superforecasters see a 73% probability that Vladimir Putin will win the next Russian presidential election with 75% or more of the votes. Putin's approval ratings have been high and are likely to remain so as the war in Ukraine continues, according to the Superforecasters. Pre-election approval ratings have been indicative of the vote percentage in at least the past two elections. On the other hand, Evgeny Prigozhin's revolt has revealed cracks in Putin's regime. Some Superforecasters also argue that Putin may lose the support of ultra-nationalists in his country, which could still result in his victory but with less than 75% of the votes (currently 20% probability).


SUPERFORECASTER COMMENTARY HIGHLIGHTS:

05 Sep 23 - Comment: This raises the possibility, however small, of answer option D: ISW - "The Kremlin is reportedly planning to cancel gubernatorial elections in the Republic of Khakassia."

24 Aug 23 - Comment: A younger, more confident Putin might have tolerated a result below 75%, but I doubt the 2024 version will.

21 Aug 23 - Comment: Russia's recent Luna mission to the moon failed. I'm not sure this is a strong enough signal, however, given that the Russian populace seem to be well-insulated from anything that makes the government seem weak.

08 Aug 23 - Comment: Peskov was obviously just joking about not holding elections to illustrate that, of course, Putin will win easily. However, it probably also means that they are dead serious about targeting the 75%+ vote. I'm going up on answer option A significantly, and keeping option C the same - it's too early for the war to go completely disastrous for Russia (which is the only condition for Putin's replacement).

08 Aug 23 - Comment: From Moscow Times: "Kremlin Says 'Theoretically Possible' to Not Hold Presidential Elections."

03 Aug 23 - Comment: 78% approved the constitutional amendment allowing Putin to stay in the role of President through 2036, and his July approval rating is 82%. So, he will resoundingly win the 2024 presidential election.

30 Jul 23 - Comment: Levada's July poll is out. Putin's approval rating is at 82%, up from 81% in June.

22 Jul 23 - Comment: There are no serious incentives to not hold an election, as this would make Russia look unstable -- which Putin will want to avoid. So far, there seems to be no one else willing to challenge Putin. The difficult choice is thus between answer options A and B. The public support for Wagner suggested that indeed people are unhappy -- it remains unclear, however, if this applies to the military leadership or to Putin directly. I suspect that Putin's image is still solid, as opposed to the image of the military leadership.

22 Jul 23 - Comment: Igor Girkin oversteps with his criticism of Putin and is arrested. From Reuters: "Prominent Russian nationalist Igor Girkin, who had publicly accused President Vladimir Putin and the army top brass of not pursuing the war in Ukraine harshly or effectively enough, was remanded in custody on Friday on charges of inciting extremism. ... Girkin had been regarded by many as untouchable due to his history and ties to the authorities, but had become more outspoken in recent months. ... [O]n his official Telegram channel, followed by more than 760,000 people, Girkin peppered Putin with personal insults and urged him to pass power 'to someone truly capable and responsible'."

05 Jul 23 - Comment: (1) A Levada study "confirms our earlier findings that the June 23-24 uprising did not affect the president's ratings, but led to a decline in public support for Sergei Shoigu. Attitudes towards Yevgeny Prigozhin have deteriorated sharply, today only one in five respondents support him."
(2) Another Superforecaster makes the point that approval ratings have been accurate predictors of vote percentages in the last two elections. According to Levada-Center, Putin's approval rating is at 81% as of June 2023.
(3) From Foreign Affairs: "Putin's team plans on making sure the president gets more than the record-breaking 77 percent of the vote he won in 2018."

03 Jul 23 - Comment: Putin is unlikely to go away via an election, unless he promotes a successor. That doesn't seem too likely to me, though. Not sure about the vote threshold, but the high approval rating is probably indicative.

28 Jun 23 - Comment: Putin's June 2023 approval rating, according to the Levada poll: 81% approve. It would be interesting to see whether the Ukrainian counter-offensive and the Prigozhin incident will have a measurable effect on his July and August numbers. I doubt it, but you never know.

26 Jun 23 - Comment: At the moment, it looks like Putin's position has been weakened considerably.

24 Jun 23 - Comment: Assuming Putin gets past the current problem with the Wagner Group, he might be keener to show his strength with a bigger win in the next election. If he does not get past the current problem, the next election might not take place as planned or someone else might win it.

10 Jun 23 - Comment: Assuming he is still in power, Putin will probably insist on the numbers showing he won at least 75% of the vote. That said, I think there is a real possibility that things go disastrously in Ukraine and he falls in the next year because of it.

01 Jun 23 - Comment: With the war, I can see a scenario where the election is cancelled or postponed due to some "emergency" situation.

29 May 23 - Comment: All of this is pretty much about how the war is going. And by now, the time frame is only 10 months.
Bin D: Only if there is some sort of a catastrophic collapse of the Russian political system. Otherwise, the Russians never move election dates. Probably <0.5%.
Bin C: Putin dies or is incapacitated (<0.5%), or is removed by a coup (1%?).
Bin B: More probable than A only if the war goes very badly or if the economy takes a dive. NB: In Russia, the current status quo = they're slowly but surely winning. Economically, Russia seems to have adjusted far beyond expectations. E.g., its inflation now is the lowest among all European countries. And, for a view outside of what's in the newspapers daily, see a recent paper (written by Ken Galbraith's son) that argues that the sanctions are "a gift" to Russia.
Apart from some freak accident, I continue to expect a long war with neither side having a decisive upper hand. Also not to be discounted: If the Kremlin truly targets 75% (a big "if", actually), there are certainly ways to adjust the vote slightly to get there.

17 May 23 - Comment: Persuaded by others that if there's an election, Putin will want to get 75%+ by any means necessary.

06 May 23 - Comment: The biggest question is what Putin wants the margin to be. It seems there's enough investment in the idea of democracy as window dressing that I don't think they will cancel the election entirely, but leaving 10% in option D in case things go very badly in Ukraine or on the domestic front and the election is postponed or cancelled.

05 May 23 - Comment: Putin will probably die in office; it's too dangerous for him not to be on top. His approval rating remains above 80%, so winning with a high percentage of the vote seems likely.

02 May 23 - Comment: Staying relatively low for Putin. His problem won't be a democratic opposition, it will be the ultra-nationalists.

01 May 23 - Comment: Approval ratings have been accurate predictors of vote percentages in the last two elections. The three elections prior to that, not so much. Still, Putin's goal of topping 75% is quite possible, even likely, given where his polls are today and are likely to be in 10 months' time. Putin's wartime approval ratings have never fallen below 77%. The war will not be close to over in 10 months' time. My expectation is that the lines will shift back and forth, but the stalemate will continue. If Putin's approval ratings remain in the 77%-83% range and his vote percentage matches his pre-election rating, as it has in 2012 and 2018, then this will close A. This is my base case scenario (67%). Regarding B, even if Putin's ratings continue to hover around 80%, there is still a chance that he underperforms his polls this time around (30%). Regarding C (2%), there is no reason to think Putin won't run for president again and easily win against controlled opposition. There is no evidence that he is sick. Regarding D, there is no reason to think the election will be postponed or cancelled. Wartime elections are not unusual, but I'll leave 1% on D just in case.

28 Apr 23 - Comment: Ever since the Ukraine invasion, Putin's approval rating has skyrocketed from a baseline of roughly 65 percent to roughly 80 percent with no signs of decline other than natural noise and variation.

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BACKGROUND:

Opened 20 September 2022

The Quad countries are the US, India, Japan, and Australia. Tensions continue in the South China Sea and elsewhere, with increasing fears of some form of military confrontation. For the purposes of this question, drones may be considered part of "forces" if so claimed by the accusing party's forces. Accusations of "warning shots" being fired would count. An accusation of a vessel or aircraft deliberately ramming another would count, but accidental collisions would not. Cyberattacks and the use of directed-energy weapons (e.g., microwaves, sonic weapons) would not count. An accusation by one Quad country against another Quad country would not count, and both the accused use and the accusation must occur during the question's open period to count.

Examples of Superforecaster commentary in italics

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AT A GLANCE:

19 September 2023 - Good Judgment's professional Superforecasters see a 25% probability that either a Quad country or the PRC will make an accusation of weapons use by the other party against their forces before 2025. According to the Superforecasters, the key risk factors are continued tensions and increased military assets from all sides in regions of contested sovereignty, potentially leading to an accident.


SUPERFORECASTER COMMENTARY HIGHLIGHTS:

12 Sep 23 - Comment: Xi snubbing India by not attending G-20 meeting in India. Economic rivalry adding to tension.

24 Aug 23 - Comment: Interesting discussion of China's "little blue men." From CNN: "Is a militia Beijing says doesn't exist causing trouble in the South China Sea?" Presumably if China's maritime militia were treated as a legal combatant, it would count for the purposes of this question.

22 Aug 23 - Comment: Things look calmer for now, but plenty of time for this to blow up. I'll wait to see how these events go before downgrading: the BRICS group summit of emerging markets this month, and the Group of 20 summit in New Delhi in September.

10 Aug 23 - Comment: China used water cannons against a recent Philippine resupply mission to the Second Thomas Shoal. Water cannons may not be considered a weapon, but an over-reaction to such (the insult!) might result in weapons use.

08 Aug 23 - Comment: China and India military build-up in the Himalayas continues. No agreements yet, but at least they are still talking.

03 Aug 23 - Comment: Incremental attempts to stabilize US-China relations with Secretary of State's visit to Beijing in June, followed by the Treasury Secretary's in July. Now talks of a possible Biden-Xi summit later this year.

26 Jul 23 - Comment: The conflict between China and India continues to simmer just below the surface. From Bloomberg: "India rejected Chinese carmaker BYD Co.'s proposal to build a $1 billion electric-vehicle plant in partnership with a local company, according to people with knowledge of the matter. The Indian government dismissed the plan from BYD and Hyderabad-based Megha Engineering and Infrastructures Ltd. on national security concerns, the people said, asking not to be identified as the decision is not yet public. The use of Chinese homegrown technology is a concern [...]."

17 Jul 23 - Comment: The China-India border conflict is ongoing. Even sticks count and more skirmishes are likely (72%).

06 Jul 23 - Comment: India is developing light tanks to counter China's in disputed border regions.

26 Jun 23 - Comment: Times of India reports that last week marked three years since the Galwan clash but "when viewed along with the critical reporting on India by China's official media, there appears little likelihood of a change in China's attitude towards India."

18 Jun 23 - Comment: I think warning shots being fired would be the most likely scenario to occur for a "yes." The other possibility is China and India having another skirmish. In terms of the likelihood of these events happening, I think it's on the lower end - all parties are being careful to not cause a significant incident.

12 Jun 23 - Comment: China-India is most likely, due to continuing tensions.

06 Jun 23 - Comment: Two recent incidents involving US and Chinese military forces underscore the potential for this to resolve as a yes.

22 May 23 - Comment: This is not going to fly and will only increase tension: "In the strategically significant area of Depsang plains in Ladakh, China's People's Liberation Army has demanded the creation of a 15-20km buffer zone or no patrol zone inside India-claimed lines as a precondition for disengagement, Kolkata-based The Telegraph reports, citing an official from the intelligence wing of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP)."

09 May 23 - Comment: Momentarily increasing the probability by two percentage points. The reason is not only the bellicose rhetoric coming from China, but also something seemingly unrelated: the recent crackdown on due diligence, auditing and consulting firms in China. This crackdown has happened just a few months after China declared that it was reopened for business and welcoming foreign investment (but apparently under the condition that you should not know anything about your investment). To me this looks simply dysfunctional. The best explanation I have heard is that they think China is such a large market that nobody will pull out because of this crackdown. If true, this only means that probably they are prone to miscalculations in every front: from foreign investment to military confrontation. The probability of an accident with India or the US cannot be discarded under these conditions.

04 May 23 - Comment: China claims it warned away a US Navy ship in the South China Sea in March. The potential for escalation remains.

18 Apr 23 - Comment: There is a thaw right now between Australia and China. China needs some of Australia's natural resources and Australia needs the trade with China. Having said that, the tension with US continues. Japan is building up a military and pressing claim of Pacific Islands, so more tension there. The most likely near-term conflict is with India. China and India are in a competition for most attractive market going forward. China's population is aging while India will surpass it in population.

03 Apr 23 - Comment: The bar is low, and with Xi's recent rhetoric, I think warning shots are possible.

23 Mar 23 - Comment: The rhetoric suggests the Quad countries believe the risk of conflict is rising. From AP: "The top diplomats of Australia, India, Japan and the United States offered sharp but veiled criticism of China on Friday, even as they maintained their Indo-Pacific-focused bloc is not aimed at countering Beijing. In comments at a public event and in a written statement, the four foreign ministers used buzzwords and phrases that reflected growing unease over China's influence in the region and made clear the group aims to be an alternative to China."

05 Mar 23 - Comment: I don't expect anything in the short term, so staying at 40%. I believe China is trying to play the neutral, benevolent role. They are trying to differentiate themselves from the debacle that is Russia invading Ukraine. So they are holding talks with India. But they are building up their military spending at faster rates than other areas of their budget. And they spent last year building a military base near the LOC with India. I expect to move higher rather than lower as this timeline progresses into next year.

28 Feb 23 - Comment: Talks between India and China, but no breakthroughs. First high-level face-to-face, but same as the lower level talks held regularly. No resolution. Military build-up in Himalayas continues. The ongoing talks did not prevent conflict in December.

23 Feb 23 - Comment: More US troops to be deployed to Taiwan.

22 Feb 23 - Comment: Looks like neither the China/India incident nor the 'balloongate' triggered the resolution. But these incidents do illustrate how easily things can get out of hand enough for a Yes. Note that pundits are claiming Xi didn't know about the balloon. That indicates a certain level of independent action by those in the Chinese military. The possibility of independent action, in my opinion, raises the chances.

07 Feb 23 - Comment: While the China/India border has had lots of clashes, there has only been one incident of shots fired since 1975.

07 Feb 23 - Comment: Although I think it is more likely than not that some kind of confrontation occurs between the parties mentioned, it is hard to say whether a public accusation would be made. In past instances in history, not just with the relevant parties, we had seen this lack of public accusation before. For example, when Israel and Hamas were fighting in spite of an established ceasefire, none of the parties seemed to make a public accusation(s) that the other violated the ceasefire.

06 Feb 23 - Comment: I begin at 40% for "yes" on the basis of China/India LAC. The resolution bar is low, and the issue is still hotly contested, if not violently in the last year or so. It calmed down in 2022, but I believe that was because China was building military infrastructure in the region.

17 Jan 23 - Comment: A China-India clash is the most likely way this happens. While the probability of war is low, a clash or skirmish is likely. Good article on how China may be underestimating how serious India takes the Himalaya line of control.

10 Jan 23 - Comment: It was thought by China at first that the Quad would not take any real action because China is a big market for all of them. The Quad is morphing into more than talk. On December 9, China did use weapons in clash with India. It is not likely to be the last clash between India and China.

21 Dec 22 - Comment: India and China both have their reasons for downplaying the clash along the line of control. Between now and 2025, it is likely to happen again and perhaps in a more severe form. Australia and China are talking, so perhaps a lowering of tension there. Japan is arming itself, which is dismaying to China. Xi and Biden have met, but tensions in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea continue. Russia's Medvedev met with Xi in China. The Russia-Chinese partnership on energy bothers the US. Xi did, however, tell Medvedev that China prefers negotiations on Ukraine rather than war. The latter should help keep tensions from increasing with Quad. In sum, the India-China border region the most concerning, followed by Taiwan Strait. Any move by Taiwan toward independence might provoke an action that would involve the US and possibly the Quad.

14 Dec 22 - Comment: "India is covering up the true extent of border clashes with China to avoid panicking the public, senior Indian Army sources have told The Telegraph."

12 Dec 22 - Comment: No info yet if weapons were used or not.

12 Dec 22 - Comment: Just in: Clash between China and India.

05 Dec 22 - Comment: Increasing security cooperation between the other Quad countries and the US could result in more tension.

02 Dec 22 - Comment: Like Biden, Modi reached out to Xi in Bali, keeping the lines of communication open. Fundamentally, however, nothing has changed with regards to China's aspirations and intent.

29 Nov 22 - Reuters: China says its troops will remain on high alert. Comment: Xi may want his nation to look outward and could create an incident to whip up nationalism.

18 Nov 22 - Comment: The recent Biden-Xi meetings are a positive development, but given the long window, I'm sticking with my previous forecast of 25% until there are more tangible signs of increasing cooperation, such as tariff reductions, new treaties, etc.

09 Nov 22 - Comment: I think China will hold off until Taiwan's 2024 elections in deciding whether to attack Taiwan. They may want to build their own economy first. Possibility is in that 2024-25 region. On the other hand, if China's economy is faltering, they may try the trick of whipping up nationalism and attack Taiwan's outer islands or do an embargo as a diversion. How would the Quad respond to that? Also, China is interested in what India is doing militarily. They are both nuclear powers and their relationship is strained. And the US putting B-52s with nukes in Australia ought to ratchet up tension.

02 Nov 22 - Comment: Three years out, lots of potential for negative interaction in the SCS, and here's one more: The US is reportedly planning to deploy up to six nuclear-capable B-52 bombers to an air base in northern Australia.

02 Nov 22 - Comment: This is a long-term question. An unidentifiable torpedo or drone attack could well happen and lead to accusations. A third country might get a hold of an identifiable Chinese weapon to create a problem. Neither is likely but possible.

26 Oct 22 - Comment: India and China have fought at the border called the Line of Actual Control (LAC). China talks of normalcy but not peace there.

19 Oct 22 - Comment: Xi in his CCP speech stated he wants to build his military, not that they have parity at this point. Lowering the probability of this, but 2025 leaves a lot of time for accidents or a crisis to happen.

12 Oct 22 - Comment: China sees the Quad as a kind of Asian NATO. It seems most worried by India's participation. Interesting that both China and India call for Russia to de-escalate. They have both pulled troops back from the Himalayas. Tension might increase, however, as manufacturing moves to India from China.

05 Oct 22 - Comment: Lowering my probability due to disengagement of troops in the Himalayas.

03 Oct 22 - Comment: Perhaps a new direction will emerge from the Party Congress. At this point, I'll start with optimism that the Party Congress will focus on solving internal issues. The China-India border issue may indeed boil over again, but I assume both sides want to avoid the situations of the past.

25 Sep 22 - Comment: This is a long timeline. China has said it prefers a peaceful solution but will not accept any move toward Taiwan's independence. Taiwan has been careful not to declare independence, but the general population there feels more allegiance to Taiwan than China. The Chinese military practice is attempting to stop Taiwan's populace from clamoring for independence. The Quad countries have pledged to protect each other, and Japan has pledged to protect Taiwan. Stasis is most likely. Then there is the major power competition. US legislators treating Taiwan as an independent country has gotten the waters boiling. A miscalculation is possible. This raises the chance. Most military pundits expect no invasion before 2027, but that could move up.

25 Sep 22 - Comment: I think the Chinese-Indian border remains a likely place for escalation and (small) armed conflict.

24 Sep 22 - Comment: Starting relatively high because of the long timeframe, low bar, number of countries involved (six if one considers Taiwan as an almost immediate detonant), and because previous deterrents have diminished in value or ceased to function, and diplomatic mechanisms are also in a low ebb.

24 Sep 22 - Comment: Long time left: 829 days, in which Xi might decide that his role in history is to finally bring Taiwan "home" (which would lead to escalation with the Quad countries as well) or he might decide to flex muscles in the area. How likely is a combination of drones being shot down, warning shots, and ramming in a case of alliance with one of the mentioned players? Starting this with 30%.

20 Sep 22 - Comment: I think the border with India is the biggest concern. What about throwing rocks? That's happened at high altitudes on the border between China and India.

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